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SECTION 1
!- INTRODUCTIONAND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE
I 1.I OVERVIEW
"_ The research under this contract has been directed at the problem ofI
I
automatically reconfiguring the remaining control effectors of an aircraft
that has suffered one or more control effector failures. This problem hasJ
been motivated by several recent incidents involving commercial aircraft [I],
r
i
! [2]* and has drawn a considerable amount of preliminary attention [3],[14].
_ As aircraft become increasingly sophisticated, and as static stability
i
• is decreased in the interests of efficiency and maneuverability, the poten-
tial damage caused by unanticipated failure increases dramatically. Although
pilots can be trained to react in the case of anticipated major failures,
they cannot be expected to respond correctly, and in time, for all conceiv-i
able failures. This is particularly frustrating because modern aircraft,
with complex controls, may remain controllable despite individual failures,
as happened recently in two well publicized cases. In one case, (a Delta
LI011 flight [2]) the pilot was able to reconfigure his available controls
[I to save the plane. In another, (the Chicago DCI0 crash [I]) the pilot could
_ not, although hindsight revealed the plane could have been saved.
The objective of the restructurable controls research is to automatically
F- and quickly solve the control problem facing a pilot during an emergency.
*References are indicated by numbers in square brackets; the list appears at
the end of of this report.
The class of problems of interest includes those where the failure or failures
are unanticipated, but excludes those unsolvable areas (wings falling off)
r_
I where the plane cannot be saved.
The general area of emergency control modification can be divided into
i
two categories: reconfigurable and restructurable control. The first cate-
gory includes failures which can be anticipated and solved in advance such as
engine or instrument failures. The most important failures in this class are
analyzed and pilots are trained in emergency procedures to compensate for
them. The major advances in reconfigurable controls in the near future may be
i expected to occur in computer storage and automatic activation of pre-solved
- emergency procedures. This involves computerizing "the book", and ensuring
J
that emergency procedures do not simply rely on pilot training and memory
] under stress.
r
The second class of problems, and the one of interest here, includes
i those emergencies which cannot easily be anticipated and planned for. It in-
cludes those cases where "the book" must be thrown out. Ideally, the solution
i
• to this class of problems would place the experience and expertise of the best
pilots and aircraft designers immediately at the disposal of the pilot in
trouble. Such experts (or their artificial intelligence embodiments) would
analyze the problem and recommend solutions (some, perhaps, unconventional).
Their actions would return the aircraft to a safe operating condition, and
they would remain available to answer "what if" questions for the remainder
of the flight, in particular involving changes to the aircraft to prepare for
landing.
This assembly of experts would, in fact, be answering the following
questions:
i. Did a failure occur?
2. What failure(s) occurred?
l 3. How can I restructure the controls to accommodate the failure(s)?
4. What else will happen if I change the controls?
i The first two questions constitute failure detection and identification,
(FDI) and have received much research interest in the last decade [4]. Auto-
matic techniques exist for determining whether a failure has occurred and for
i isolating the failure component. In addition, current research is underway
for designing robust FDI systems which can accomplish their mission with "real
J
world" plant uncertainty and disturbances.
_ If a new aircraft model were available from an FDI system, a reliable
J
automatic procedure would be required to answer the third and fourth question.
! In essence, the answer to these questions is a redesign of the flight control
system (FCS) of the aircraft. The objective of the research presented in this
• report is to begin the development of an automatic FCS redesign procedure that
is both reliable and fast.
The key features of the restructurable control problem that an automatic
redesign procedure must address are:
I. the failures are unanticipated;
2. the available response time is limited;
3. nonstandard control effectors and configurations may be
required; andl
4. the handllng/ride qualities of the reconfigured aircraft
may be degraded.
The assumptions that failures (or combinations of failures) are pot antic-
ipated and that limited time is available for reconfiguration imply that the
reconfiguratlon procedure must be on-line and highly automated. The ability to
use nonstandard control surfaces gives the control system additional degrees
of freedom to compensate for the loss of failed surfaces. Despite the addl-
i tional freedom, the loss of primary control surfaces reduces the performance
_- that the control system can achieve. However, in an emergency situation the
i
first objective is to maintain the aircraft in a stable, flyable state. Any
additional handling qualities that can be attained beyond this are desirablei
but secondary objectives. The combination of non-standard control surfaces
i with limited performance objectives, and the inherently asymmetric failure
effects, will most likely lead to nonstandard control system designs.
1.2 A STRUCTURE FOR RESTRUCTURABLE CONTROL SYSTEMS
i The complete problem of designing a restructurable control system can be
viewed as three distinct but interrelated problems. This problem structureI
can be used to define a corresponding candidate structure for restructable
control systems as illustrated in Fig. 1-2. The first operation uses a fail-
ure detection and identification (FDI) algorithm to detect failed surfaces and
identify key parameters. This information is then used to determine a flight
condition or operating point for the aircraft.
The outputs of this function are the nominal values of the control sur-
faces and a corresponding linearized model of the aircraft dynamics. The
third function trims, stabilizes and regulates the aircraft within the linear
operating region of the specified flight condition.
Although the hierarchy of Fig. I-I can be regarded as operating sequen-
tially, it is likely that the most effective implementation will have dynamic
interactions between the levels. The FDI algorithm can continue to perform
and refine its outputs during and following the operation of the lower two
4
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Figure I-I. Structure for Restructable Control Systems
5
levels. The choice of flight conditions can be modified as new failure and
f
parameter information arrives or if it is determined that the flight condition
cannot be maintained by the linear regulator with the available control
_- authority. The choice of flight condition and linear regulator also impacti
the performance of the FDI algorithm. These feedback interactions are repre-
7 sented in Fig. I-I by dashed lines.
Clearly the development of a comprehensive restructurable control system
is a complex problem. Although the functions and interactions indicated by
Fig. I-I are essential to the operation of the restructurable control system,
a reasonable approach to the development of such a system is to first consider
each of the levels separately. Once the functions at each level are under-
stood and developed, the results can be combined into a comprehensive system.
The focus of the research presented in this report is the lowest level of
the hierarchy in Fig. I-I: the development of an automatic procedure for de-
signing a linear trim and regulation system. The main emphasis will be placed
on the automatic regulator design, however, the formulation of a linear trim
system also will be discussed. Each of these procedures must address a multi-
variable control problem. Although the topic of multlvariable control has
been studied for many years and numerous approaches to multivariable control
system design have been developed [5], none of the design methods can be de-
scribed as automatic. Typically, good designs still require good engineering
judgement applied with an efficient design procedure. Thus the development
of an automatic design procedure must translate "good engineering judgment"
into design rules that can be applied automatically. The difficulty of this
task is lessened by the relaxed performance demands that are present in the
restructurable control problem.
1.3 SUMMARY OF THE AUTOMATIC REDESIGN PROCEDURE
The most significant contribution of this report is the development and
f
1 preliminary analysis of a simple, reliable automatic redesign procedure for
restructurable control. This procedure is based on Linear Quadratic (LQ)
design methodologies. It employs a robust control system design for the
! unfailed aircraft to minimize the effects of failed surfaces and to extend
i
the time available for restructuring the FCS. The procedure uses the LQ
I design parameters for the unfailed system as a basis for choosing the design
parameters of the failed system. This philosophy allows the engineering
J
trade-offs that were present in the nominal design to be inherited by the
r- restructurable design. In particular, it allows bandwidth limitations and
performance trade-offs to be incorporated in the redesigned system.
I The procedure also has several other desirable features. It effectively
redistributes authority among the available control effectors to maximize the
system performance subject to actuator limitations and constraints. It pro-
vides a graceful performance degradation as the amount of control authority
lessens. When given the parameters of the unfailed aircraft, the automatic
redesign procedure reproduces the nominal control system design. The proce-
dure can incorporate the uncertainty of the aircraft control and stability
derivatives that may arise from the use of nonstandard control configura-
tions or from estimates of these derivatives supplied by the FDI algorithm.
Finally, the automatic redesign procedure is conceptually simple, easily
implemented, and computationally fast.
i
1.4 OUTLINE
The remainder of this report is divided into five sections. Section 2
I
i discusses the formulation of the linear trim problem and an approach to its
solution. Section 3 presents the automatic design procedure and discusses its
l
theoretical interpretations. The performance of the automatic design proce-
j-- dure is demonstrated on a transport class aircraft (a Boeing 737 model) in
Section 4, and on a fighter class aircraft in Section 5. The results of the
research and recommendations for future research are summarized in Section 6.
_- 1.5 LIST OF SYMBOLS AND NOTATION
dL _ limit vector
dLS _ left stabilizer command
dRS 5 right stabilizer command
7 m _ dimension of the input
n E dimension of the system state
na m dimension of the aircraft state
nc _ dimension of the compensator state
p _ roll rate
q _ pitch rate
r _ yaw rate
s _ complex frequency
u _ input
u forward velocity of the aircraft
uo _ linear trim solution
ui _ left singular vectors
us _ input vector for system with stabilizer dynamics
8
v _ side velocity of the aircraft
vi £ eigenvectors
I Vsl,Vs2 _ right eigenvector for the stabilizer poles
Vsl,Vs2 _ portions of right eigenvectors for the stabilizer poles
I w _ disturbance
_ w _ vertical velocity of the aircraft
J
x _ system state
xo _ linear trim state solution
xa _ aircraft state
xc _ compensator state
F- xI _ integrator state
i
Xs _ combined aircraft and stabilizer states
r---
! y _ variables to be regulated
A £ system dynamics matrix
F
A system matrix with reflected eigenvalues
Aa _ aircraft dynamics matrix
i Ac _ compensator dynamics matrix
Aca _ compensator-alrcraft state matrix
As _ combined aircraft and stabilizer dynamics matrix
B _ system input matrix
B
= true input matrix
I Ba _ aircraft input matrix
Bc _ compensator input matrix
Bs _ combined aircraft and stabilizer input matrix
_B _ error between true and system input matrix
C _ output matrix
Ca _ aircraft output matrix
D _ design return difference matrix
q D _ true return difference matrix
E _ disturbance matrix
F _ state limit matrix
f-- G _ state feedback matrix
1
H _ input limit matrix
J J _ quadratic cost functional
I _ identity matrix
i.
i K _ regulator Riccati equation solution
_I L _ loop transfer function
Lc _ transfer function from input to state weighting
i M _ square root of state penalty matrix
M _ scaling matrix for adjusting singular values
MI _ square root of the integrator weighting matrix
MI,M2, _ square roots of state weighting matrices for designs
M3,M 4 1 through 4
M',M'' _ columns of square root of state weighting matrix chosen
to retain stabilizer poles
N _ square root of input penalty matrix
NO _ square root of the nominal input penalty matrix
P _ bandwidth normalization matrix
Q _ state penalty matrix
Q0 _ state penalty matrix for the nominal design
QI,Q2, _ state penalty matrices for designs I through 4
Q3,Q4
Qd _ trim state penalty matrix
10
R E input penalty matrix
R0 5 input penalty matrix for the nominal design
I Rd _ trim input/output penalty matrix
S _ sensitivity transfer function
U,U m matrices of left singular vectors
f-- V _ matrix of right singular vectors
V E matrix of right eigenvectors
II Vs _ matrix of right eigenvectors of left half plane eigenvalues
V u _ matrix of right eigenvectors of right half plane eigenvalues
W E transformed expected effectiveness matrix
W _
= matrix of left eigenvectors
Wo _ observability Grammian
i Wco _ controllability-observability Grammian
_s _ matrix of left eigenvectors of left half plane eigenvalues
-
= matrix of left eigenvectors of right half plane eigenvalues
Wu _ control effectiveness uncertainty matrixi
Y m transformed optimization variables
Bijk% _ covariance between the (i,j) and (k,%) elements of the
input matrix error
6LT E left engine thrust
6RT E right engine thrust
i 6LS _ left stabilizer
_- _RS _ right stabilizer
6R _ rudder
6LE _ left elevator
6RE m right elevator
II
t
6LA _ left aileron
6RA _ right aileron
e _ pitch angle
_ p _ scaling for input penalty matrix
o,_ _ singular values
{j Ts _ stabilizer time constant
_ roll angle
r-_
! m _
= frequency
_c = bandwidth constraint (crossover) frequency
J
I As _ diagonal matrix of left half plane eigenvalues
hu _ diagonal matrix of right half plane eigenvalues
Z _ diagonal matrix of singular values
1.5.2 Functions
AT _ transpose of the matrix A
AH
= complex conjugate of the transpose of the matrix A
eA _ matrix exponential of A
E{.} _ expected value
%min _ minimum eigenvalue of the indicated matrix
SECTION 2
AN APPROACH TO THE AUTOMATIC DESIGN OF A LINEAR TRIM SYSTEM
r
l 2.1 INTRODUCTIONf
_-- This section presents the formulation and formal solution of a linear
l
i trim problem. A linear trim system (i.e., a system that trims the aircraft
within the given flight condition) is needed because a control effector fail-f
ure such as a stuck surface (c.f. [2]) can create a constant force or moment
7
disturbance that must be accommodated within the chosen flight condition.
This accommodation can be handled either in the regulator system through the
J
use of integral control or, if the disturbance can be measured, in a linear
trim subsystem through the use of feedforward control. The latter approach
has the advantages of rapid response to disturbances and of not adversely
i affecting the stability of the system. Its disadvantage is that any errors
between the measured and true disturbance will appear directly in the output.
2.2 THE DISTURBANCE REJECTION PROBLEM
Assume that the linearized model of the aircraft at the chosen flight
condition is given by:
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + Ew (2-I)
where x(t) is the state vector of the llnearized aircraft dynamics, u(t) is
the vector of available control surfaces (i.e., failed surfaces are deleted)
and w is a vector of constant disturbances.
13
j_
The vector w can be used to represent forces and moments generated by
failed surfaces. Examples include the rolling moment caused by the engine
loss in the AA DC-10 incident [I] and the pitching and rolling moments induced
by the left elevator in the Delta L-1011 incident [2]. This disturbance vec-
tor may either be measured (e.g., an identified rolling moment supplied by the
FDI algorithm) or unmeasurable.
The objectives of the linear control system designed for the linearized
F---
model (2-I) are, in order of priority:
I. stabilize the system;
2. reduce or eliminate the effects of the disturbance vector w
on key state variables; and
! 3 achieve desirable flying qualities.i
That is, the primary objective is to produce a control system that achieves a
stable, wings level, constant altitude flight. The secondary objective is to
enhance the performance of the failed aircraft. This objective well only be
considered applicable after the first objective is achieved. The thrust of
i this research assumes that the failure of the aircraft is such that the first
objective can be achieved with the remaining control surfaces. The problems
of stabilizing and achieving desirable flying qualities will be addressed by
-- the automatic design procedure developed in Section 3. The problem of steady
state disturbance rejection will be formulated in this subsection and a feed-
forward control solution for measured disturbances will be presented in sub-
section 2.3.
Let the key states that are to be regulated be denoted by:
y = Cx (2-2)
Typically, the elements of y would represent states such as the altitude and
bank angle of the aircraft. The objective of our problem will be to automat-
ically design the control system to guarantee that the system is stable, that
y = 0, (2-3)
and to achieve as much performance as possible.
-- Two different situations are of interest:
I. a measurement of the disturbance w is available; and
] 2 the disturbance w is unmeasurable.j
In the first case, the disturbance measurement can be fed forward by the con-
i trol system to mitigate the effects of the disturbance on the variable y. In
r- the second case, the effects of the disturbances can be eliminated by incor-
porating integral feedback in the compensation. The advantages of feedforward
] compensation are that it is fast and it does not adversely affect the stabil-
ity of the system. The disadvantage is that any error in the measurement of
the disturbance will show up in the output. The use of integral control will
guarantee that the variables y will be driven to zero. However, the response
i
will be slower than that of an equivalent feedforward system, and the inte-
grators make the stabilization problem more difficult. In general, if distur-
bance measurements are available, it is desirable to incorporate both feed-
forward and integral feedback in the control system design.
This report will address both feedback structures to some extent. The
feedforward problem will be formulated and its solution will be briefly
discussed. Since this problem involves an open loop control structure, the
only major automatic design issues relate to the on-line solution of the
problem. The regulator problem with integral feedback will be discussed in
Section 3.
15
2.3 DISTURBANCE REJECTION WITH MEASURED DISTURBANCES
In this subsection, we assume that some or all of the disturbances w
affecting the system (2-I) can be measured. The measurements can be used
directly to minimize the effect of the disturbances on the important states
(2-2).
_-- In general, there are three important components to the formulation offl
this problem. The principal objective is to maintain stable flight with cer-
r---
I tain specified states (2-2) set to zero (2-3) Stable flight implies that the!
state derivative be zero:
0 = Ax + Bu + Ew (2-4)
In addition to (2-3) and (2-4), there will be constraints on the magnitudes
! of the control surfaces and states. We represent these constraints using a
linear inequality:
Fx + Hu < dL (2-5)
i Given the objectives (2-3)-(2-5), there may or may not be a set of states
Xo and control surfaces uo that satisfy all three. If a pair (Xo, Uo) satis-
fying (2-3)-(2-5) do exist, there will generally be more than one such pair.
-- In this case, we will try to choose the pair of least norm:
Feasible Disturbance Rejection Problem
minimize x°T QdXo + UoT Rduo (2-6)
subject to 0 = Axo + Buo + Ew (2-7)
0 = Cxo (2-8)
Fx° + Huo < dL (2-9)
16
Several comments are in order. First, the objective (2-6) attempts to
keep the disturbed state and resulting control surface deflections as small as
possible. The weightlngs Qd and Rd can be used to specify the relative impor-
tance of states and controls. These choices can be made off-line based on the
physical characteristics of the aircraft and its control surfaces.
Secondly, it should be noted that if a solution to (2-6)-(2-9) exists,
it guarantees that the principal objectives (2-7)-(2-9) have been satisfied.
That is, the important states can be zeroed (2-8), stable flight is possible
(2-7), and no prespeclfied state or control constraints have been violated
! (2-9).
r- Finally, it should be noted that (2-6)-(2-9) must be solved on-llne after
[ the disturbance w has been measured. However, (2-6)-(2-9) is a standard qua-
] dratlc programming problem for which a number of fast, efficient solution algo-
rithms have been developed. If (2-9) is not present (2-6)-(2-8) is simply a
least squares problem whose solution can be found by:
[][ ][]i x A B # Eo = w (2-10)uo C 0 0
where # denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse (see [6] for details).
It is possible that (2-7)-(2-9) overspeclfy the problem. In this case,
_ it is impossible to achieve the objectives of the restructurable control prob-
lem at the chosen flight condition. However, a variation of (2-6)-(2-9) can
_- be used to gain time to choose a new nominal flight condition or to achieve a
slowly degrading flight. The key is to try to minimize the size of both the
key state variables and the state derivatives:
17
Infeasible Disturbance Rejection Problem
minimize
[Axo + Buo + Ew]T Od [Axo + Buo + Ew] + [Cxo]TRd [CXo] (2-11)
subject to
Fxo + Huo < dL (2-12)
The objective (2-11) attempts to keep the size of the state derivative
and key state variables small. The welghtlngs Qd and Rd can be chosen off-llne
to reflect the relative importance of the state derivatives and key states.
i
I A solution to (2-11)-(2-12) wlll exist as long as the state and control con-
_- straints (2-12) have a non-empty solution set.]
As wlth (2-6)-(2-9), the preceding formulation (2-11)-(2-12) is a quad-
I ratlc programming problem that can be easily solved on-line using existing
algorithms. If (2-12) is not present, then the solution is also given by
2-10).
18
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SECTION 3
i THE AUTOMATIC REDESIGN PROCEDURE
7
i 3.1 STATE MODEL AND LINEAR QUADRATIC REGULATOR
The purpose of this subsection is to present the problem formulation
Y that forms the basis for the automatic redesign procedure. Let the open loop
_- linearlzed aircraft dynamics be described in state variable form as:
Xa(t) = Aa Xa(t) + Ba u(t) (3-I)
n
where Xa(t ) E R a is the aircraft state and u(t) E Rm is the vector of control
effectors available in the unfailed aircraft. Let the key output variables
r y(t) be given by
y(t) = Ca Xa(t ) (3-2)
i where y(t) € RP with p _ rank (B). Let any compensator dynamics (e.g.,
integral, lead, and lag elements) also be represented in state variable form
as:
xc(t) = Ac xc(t) + Aca xa(t) + Bc u(t) (3-3)
n
! where xc(t ) E R c is the compensator state vector. In particular, (3-3) can
represent the integral control required to eliminate constant disturbances of
the form considered in Section 2.
The entire system can then be represented in state form as
19
-- x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) (3-4)
y(t) = Cx(t) (3-5)
where
E''a]A = (3-6)O Aa
F- B = (3-7)| Ba
i
c = 0 ca (3-8)
ff--
Linear-Quadratic (LQ) design methodology will be used as the basis for
F_
the restructuring algorithm. The LQ regulator problem can be stated as
follows. Find the control u(t) that minimizes:
J = f [ xT Qx + uT Ru ] dt (3-9)0
The optimal control that minimizes (3-9) is given by
u(t) = -R-I BT K x(t) A-G x(t) (3-10)
where K solves the algebraic Riccati equation
0 = AT K + _ + Q -K B R-I BT K (3-11)
Assuming that the linearized model is valid and that integral control
is used, the feedback law (3-10) guarantees that the llnearized closed loop
system will be stable, and that the important states (3-2) will approach zero
regardless of the value of the disturbances. Thus the primary goals of
20
i
-- stability and disturbance rejection will be met by any LQ regulator design.
However, certain performance limitations (such as control surface bandwidth)
and secondary performance objectives must also be considered.
3.2 FREQUENCY DOMAIN PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION
Many performance issues are most readily discussed in terms of the sensi-
tivity function (i.e., the inverse of the return difference) of the closed
loop system evaluated at the plant inputs:
S(s) = [I + G (sl-A)-I B]-I (3-12)
c_
[
The relationship of S to feedback system performance has been discussed exten-
sively in the literature (c.f. [7]-[i0]). In general, one obtains benefits
from feedback at those frequencies for which
g S(j_) II< 1 (3-13)
The benefits include improved response due to dynamic input disturbances and
a reduction of the effects of parameter variation. The frequency range over
which (3-13) can be achieved is generally limited by the dynamic uncertainty
of the plant, sensors, and actuators. As a result of these uncertainties, the
-- loop transfer function
L(s) = G (sl - A) -I B (3-14)
must be rolled off before the uncertainties become significant.
The sensitivity function of a LQ regulator possesses special properties.
It satisfies the Kalman equality [II]:
S(-s) -T R S(s)-I = R + BT (-sI-A)-T Q(sI-A)-IB (3-15)
21
Equation (3-15) expresses the return difference of the closed loop system in
terms of the open loop system and the penalty matrices Q and R. Thus the per-
formance of the closed loop system can be determined analytically in terms of
the LQ design parameters. This point will be exploited in the automatic
! design procedure described in the sequel.
S Equation (3-15) is often more conveniently viewed in a slightly modified
form. Let N denote the inverse of the square root of R, i.e.
R = N-TN -I (3-16)
F--
i
i Pre- and post-multiplylng (3-15) by NT and N respectively gives:
[NT S(-s) -T N-T] IN-I S(s)-IN] = I + NTBT (-sl-A) -T Q(sI-A)-I BN (3-17)
i The left side of (3-17) is a quadratic form that represents the size of
the closed loop return difference as weighted by the input penalty matrix.
This weighting normallzes the return difference with respect to the relative
-- importance of the controls. The right hand side is the sum of a posltlve
seml-definite definite matrix and the identity. Consequently, the weighted
return difference is always greater than unity. The amount by which it
exceeds unity (and hence the amount of beneficial feedback) is determined
explicitly and analytically by Q and N (equivalently R).
-- The bandwidth limitations on the loop transfer function L(s) (3-14) can
be imposed by unmodeled plant, sensor, or actuator dynamics. We will assume
that these constraints can be expressed in terms of a constraint on the norm
of the loop transfer function at the input of the closed loop plant of the
following form:
22
mII PL(ja_c) II € 1 (3-18)
-- In condition (3-18), wc represents a critical frequency at which the
bandwidth constraints are imposed. Since the loops of a multlvarlable system
may have different bandwidths, the weighting matrix P is used to indicate the
relative size of the control loops at the critical frequency. In effect, the
matrix P can be regarded as scaling the input matrix for analysis purposes.
For example, suppose that in a two input system, one actuator has a bandwidth
limit of I rad/sec while the second actuator has a bandwidth limit of 10
rad/sec. These restrictions can be incorporated in a single constraint of
the form of (3-18) by specifying
0h = 10 rad/sec
1
Note that the choice of PII = i0 implies the first loop will be at most -20dB
when the second loop crosses over. Since a LQ regulator rolls off at a rate of
1 20dB/decade, the 1 rad/sec bandwidth limit on the first loop will be enforced!
The constraint (3-18) uses the control loop gain G explicitly. Since the
gain G is related to the LQ design parameters Q and R in a complex, nonlinear
manner, it is desirable to approximate (3-18) with a constraint that employs
t
Q and R explicitly. Fortunately, a simple approximation to (3-18) can be ob-
i_ rained from the Kalman Equality (3-17).l
The attempt to ensure that the loop transfer function is small (i.e., con-
dition (3-18)) can be roughly approximated by trying to keep the return differ-
ence small (i.e., near unity). The latter can be accomplished by controlling
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the size of the right hand side of (3-17). Note that the right side of (3-17)
can be written as
I + Lc(-s)TLc(S) (3-19)
where
Lc(s) = M (sI - A)-I BN (3-20)
and M is a mxm square root of Q:
Q = MTM
Thus, we can approximately impose (3-18) by using the transfer function
Lc(s) in (3-18) rather the true transfer function L(s). That is, we can re-
place (3-18) by:
i IIeM(jahl - A)-I BN _ < 1 (3-21>
Thus, (3-21) approximately represents the bandwidth limitations and is ex-
pressed only in terms of open loop and design quantities.
!
3.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUTOMATIC REDESIGN PROCEDURE
3.3.1 Formulation as an Optimization Problem
Given a failure of one or more aircraft control surfaces, the objective
of the linear restructurable control system is to redesign the linear contro_
r--
law in a manner that preserves as much of the aircraft safety and performance
as possible. Clearly, the primary objective is to stabilize the aircraft.
Assuming that this is possible for the given flight condition and available
actuator power and bandwidth, the secondary but still important objective of
J
maintaining aircraft performance can then be considered. This objective can
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be translated into the control system objective of maximizing the amount of
beneficial feedback in order both to maximize robustness due to uncertain
system parameters and to minimize disturbance effects.
The preceding considerations form the basis for the linear restructuring
algorithm developed in this section. The automatic redesign procedure will
use LQ regulator designs for the restructured FCS. Thus the design parameters
to be chosen by the automatic redesign procedure are the quadratic penalty
I matrices Q and R.
We will assume that a nominal LQ design for the unfailed aircraft is
available. The design can be characterized by the quadratic weights Qo and
Ro that were used to develop the nominal design. The automatic redesign pro-
cedure exploits the engineering trade-offs that were made in the choice of Qo
i and Ro for the unfailed aircraft by fixing
I
i Q = Qo (3-22)
I
and choosing a new value for R. The choice of Q as in (3-22) ensures that the
relative importance of each state (or combination of states) is maintained in
I the Linear Quadratic regulator problem for the failed aircraft design, therebyE
incorporating the physical engineering trade-offs from the unfailed FCS design
I
J
in the restructured design.
The design parameter that will be specified by the automatic redesign
procedure is the input penalty matrix R. The formal objective of the the
automatic design procedures will be to choose R to maximize performance in an
appropriate sense while satisfying the bandwidth constraints (3-18). Specif-
i ically, we pose the problem:
25
oo
maximize %min{ f [NTBT(-j ,,,I-A) -T Q (j_l - A)-I BN] de} (3-23)
Nc Rmxm -_
subject to
IIPG (j_cl- A)-I B ! < I (3-24)
The objective (3-23) is simply to maximize the smallest elgenvalue of
the frequency integral of the right hand side of (3-17). Consequently, this
f objective expresses the desire to maximize in an integral sense the perfor-
mance of the closed loop system.
The bandwidth constraint (3-24) can be simplified by replacing it with
F the approximation (3-21) that was developed in subsection 3.2. This approxi-
mation can be further simplified by assuming that Ro satisfies (3-21). Let
f
R-I = N NT (3-25)o o o
i - If NO satisfies(3-25),the constraint
q N-I N n < 1 (3-26)o
I guarantees that (3-21) will also be satisfied Hence (3-26) can be used toi
approximate the bandwidth constraint (3-24). A procedure for choosing N
following a failure will be developed in subsections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.
The objective function (3-23) can also be simplified. If A is a strictly!1
stable matrix, the application of Parseval's theorem to (3-23) yields the
[--
I equivalent objective:
maximize 2_ • Amin [NTBT f eATt QoeAt dt BN} (3-27)
i N_ Rmxm o
._ 26
!
r_
The integral in (3-27) is simply the infinite horizon observability Grammian
associated with the quadratic cost (3-9). It can be evaluated as the solution
to the Lyapunov equation:
ATWo + WoA + Qo = 0 (3-28)
The objective (3-27) then becomes
maximize 2_ • bin {NTBTWoBN} (3-29)
•-- Nc Rmxm
I Objective(3-29) has a nice interpretationin terms of the effectiveness
of controlon the importantstate variables. Recall that it was assumed that
Qo has been chosen to reflectthe relativeimportanceof the various state
variablesto the performanceof the aircraft. The matrix BTWoB then reflects
r- the amount of energy that can be transmitted to those variables, weighted by
i their perceived importance, from each of the available control surfaces.
r- Hence (3-29) captures the issue of quantifying control effectiveness.
If A is a strictly unstable matrix (i.e., all eigenvalues of A are in
! the open right half plane), the application of Parseval's relation to (3-23)
yields a result analogous to (3-27), but with -A replacing A. Relations anal-
[
I ogous to (3-28)-(3-29)can then be derived. Althoughwe are primarilyinter-
ested in stable airframes,A could in generalhave eigenvaluesin both the
left and right half planes. In this case, relationsanalogousto (3-27)-
i (3-28)can still be derived,but the applicationof Parseval'stheorem to
r (3-23)must incorporatea spectralfactorizationof the integrand.
i
] Specifically,assume that the system matrix has the spectraldecomposition:
J
A = u s (3-30)
o Au
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where As is a diagonal matrix with its diagonal elements being the open left
half plane eigenvalues of A, and Au is a diagonal matrix with its diagonal
elements being the open right half plane elgenvalue of A. We will assume that
any elgenvalues of A on the jm axis have been shifted by a small factor
into the left half plane. Define
o-!, o -% vu
i
Then (3-27)-(3-29) are correct with _ replacing A. For computational pur-
poses, W and V in (3-30)-(3-31) can be replaced by any matrices that effect
a decomposition of A into its stable and unstable invariant subspaces. These
matrices can be computed efficiently and accurately [12].
i, Thus, the problem considered by the automatic design procedure is:
maximize 21r Amln {NTWcoN} (3-32>N£ Rmxm
_- subject to
t
-1
B N N U _ 1 (3-33)
o
where
i Wco = BTWoB (3-34)
i
ATWo+ WoA+ Q = 0 (3-35)I
I
3.3.2 Solution of the Automatic Redesign Problem Without Uncertainty
The solution of (3-32)-(3-35) is almost trivial. Since
I
r
• Wo • 0 (3-36)
F
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i
i
-- the objective functional (3-32) is also positive for any choice of N, and is
monotonicly nondecreasing as N increases in size. Thus N should be chosen as
large as possible. The only constraint on N is the bandwidth constraint (3.33).
Hence, the choice
N = No (3-37)
solves the restructuring problem formulated in subsection 3.3.1.
Thus, in the case when information about control effector uncertainty is
not used by the automatic redesign procedure, the procedure simply solves a LQ
regulator problem with the ne___wwsystem description supplied by the FDI algorithm
and the nominal design quadratic weights Qo and Ro. This has the advantage of
not requiring any computation to choose the design parameters. Yet, since it
is the solution to the problem posed in subsection 3.3.1, the simple proceduref--
effectively maximizes the achievable performance within the bandwidth con-
straints of the system. A similar approach using output feedback has been
used successfully in [14].
j
L 3.3.3 The Automatic Redesign Procedure with Surface Uncertainty
The preceding section presented an automatic design algorithm that assumed
that the effectiveness of each of the unfailed surfaces is known. However, as
_ noted in Section I, the use of surfaces in non-standard configuration, and the
failure effects themselves, may result in uncertain control effectiveness.
i Also, the problems due to false alarms in failure detection and isolation algo-
l rithms (FDI) can be reduced by incorporating surface uncertainties in the re-
structuring algorithm. That is, an FDI algorithm can supply certainty estimates
I for surfaces that may or may not have failed. The purpose of this section is
to modify the automatic design procedure described in subsections 3.3.1 through
i 3.3.2 to incorporate estimates of uncertainty in the surface effectiveness.
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The nominal control surface effectivenesses are determined by the input
I
matrix B. We will assume that the true effectivenesses are given by B and
, that
r
B = B + AB (3-38)
where AB represents the uncertainty in the effectiveness. We will assume that
the uncertainty has zero mean:
j E { AB } = 0 (3-39)
_-- and that the covariance between the l,jth element and the (k,£)th element is:
i.
.__ E { ABij ABk£ } = Bijk£ (3-40)
The performance of the true system is determined by the singular.values
I
of the return difference:
.r- _(s) = I + G (sI-A)-I _ (3-41)
"-, The Kalman Equality for the nominal return difference D(s) is:
D(-s) T R D(s) = R + BT (-sl-A) -T Q (sl-A)-I B (3-42)
,-- Using (3-38) and the definition of _(s) (3-41) gives
I
_(-s)T R _(s) - _(-s)T R G (sI-A)-I AB
J
-ABT (-sl-A) -T GT R _(s)
(3-43)
_ + ABT (-sl-A) -T GT RG (sl-A)-I AB
J ' [ = R + BT (-sI-A) -T Q (sI-A)-I B
V
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t
To find the average performance of the control system over the range of
uncertainty, we take the expected value of both sides of (3-43). Rearranging
terms yields:
E { _(-s) T R _(s) } = R + BT (-sl-A) -T q (sl-A)-I B
(3-44)
- E { ABT (-sI-A)-T GT RG (sl-A) -I AB }
The left hand side of (3-44) represents the expected performance of the
I control system. The right hand side of (3-44) contains the same terms as the
i
Kalman equality minus a term due to the control surface effectiveness uncer-
_ tainty. Recall that the automatic design procedure was developed to maximize
the expected performance by using the frequency integration of the second and
i
third terms of (3-44).
i Before performing the integration, we should note that the term due to
the control surface uncertainty is already a function of the feedback gain G
r
i and thus of the Q and R matrices that are to be chosen. To eliminate this
_- dependency, we can use the approximation
o
r
GTRG _ Q • (3-45)[
Equation (3-44) then becomes
E { _ (-s)T R D--(s)} = R + BT (-sl-A) -T Q (sl-A)-I B
(3-46)
- E { ABT (-sI-A)-T Q (sl-A)-I AB }
Integrating the second and third terms on the right side of (3-46) and
using Parseval's theorem (with A modified, if necessary, as in (3-31) yields:
BT Wo B - E ( ABT Wo AB } (3-47)
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where Wo satisfies (3-28). Define
Wu = E { ABTWo AB } (3-48)
Then the (i,j)th element of Wu is:
n n
Wuij = [ [ 8ki_ (3-49)
- £=I k=l W°£k
Finally, we use the same objectiveas was used in subsection3.3.1 to
I define the modified automatic design algorithm. That is we attempt to maxi-!
mize the smallest eigenvalue of NTpN. The optimization problem becomes:
max _min { NT [Wco -Wu] N } (3-50)
subject to
-I
IIN 0 N , < 1 (3-51)
where Wco and W o are given by
i
I
Wco= BT Wo B (3-52)
1
1 AT Wo + W o A + Qo = 0 (3-53)
f-
! and Wu is given by (3-48)-(3-49).
"_ The solution to (3-50)-(3-52) is not quite as easy as the solution pre-
sented in subsection 3.3.2. Define
J
Y = N-1 N (3-54)of -
1
1 Then (3-50)-(3-51) become:
max kin { yT W Y } (3-55)
32
subject to
IIY II< i (3-56)r_
where
W = N-T N-I (3-57)o [Wco- Wu] o
Unlike (3-32), W may not be positive definite due to the uncertainty matrix
Wu. Thus simply taking Y to be the identity could result in a negative value
for (3-55).
The solution can be obtained in terms of the eigenvectors of W. Let the
: columns of Y be an orthonormal basis for the invariant subspace (eigenspace)
of W corresponding to the non-negative eigenvalues of W. Then Y solves
(3-55)-(3-57). The matrix N is given by
N = NO Y (3-58)
! and the design matrix R is specified by
"- R-I = N NT (3-59)],
l
[- Since W is the beneficial feedback (Wco) minus the uncertainty (Wu) , a
J
negative eigenvalue results only if uncertainty exceeds benefit in some direc-
°j tion. This direction is represented by the corresponding eigenvector of W
i
and is eliminated from consideration in the control law design. Hence, the
i solution eliminates those combinations of controls for which the control
_ uncertainty exceeds the control effectiveness within the feedback design.
- The modified automatic design algorithm can be summarized as follows.
i Once again, it assumes that a nominal LQ design has been chosen with nominal
weights Qo and Ro. It also assumes that an FDI algorithm has indicated either
a control surface failure or uncertainty about the operation of a surface.!
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Modified Automatic Design Algorithm:
_ Step 0: Pre-compute and store
-I
No= (/-'g'o)
where
Step I: Form the matrix B from the unfailed surfaces.
7
Step 2: Compute W:
W = N-TEWo co - Wul N-lo
W =BTw B
co o
I
AT W + W A + Q° --0] o o
t
n n
w l I w
_" uij £=1 k=l °J_.k
Step 3: Find the eigenvectors Vl,..., v£ corresponding to the
J positive eigenvalues of W. DefineI
N = No [Vl...v£]
i Step 4: Compute
i ' R-I = N NT
Step 5: Solve the LQ regulator problem
ATK + KA + Qo -KBR-I BT K = 0
_- G = R-I BT K
34
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SECTION 4
APPLICATION TO A TRANSPORT CLASS AIRCRAFT (BOEING 737 MODEL)
The automatic redesign procedure presented in Section 3 will be demon-
_- strated in this section on a linearized model of a Boeing 737 aircraft. The
model is described in subsection 4.1. Subsection 4.2 develops the nominal
Linear Quadratic Regulator design for the aircraft. Subsection 4.3 then
demonstrates the automatic redesign procedure on this aircraft.
4.1 Aircraft Model
A linearized model of the NASA Boeing 737 aircraft operating at different
flight conditions was supplied by NASA to ALPHATECH to demonstrate the auto-
matic design procedure. Since this aircraft has nine independent control sur-
faces, it is an ideal candidate for control restructuring. For this demon-
stration, an operating point with velocity of 217.4 feet/sec and an altitude
of i000 feet was chosen.
The linear aircraft model is in the form
I Xa(t) = Aa Xa(t) + Ba u(t) (4-1)
where x(t) is a state vector of the linear aircraft dynamics and u(t) is the
I vector of available control surfaces The state vector is given by
T
xa = { u, w, q, 8, v, p, r, # } (4-2)
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-- where u is the forward velocity, w is the vertical velocity, q is the pitch
rate, O is the pitch angle, _ is the side velocity, p is the roll rate, r is
the yaw rate and _ is the roll angle. The NASA model included a ninth state
for yaw angle which was eliminated since it will not be controlled by the
regulation system. The longitudinal dynamics are uncoupled from the lateral
dynamics. The first four states represent the longitudinal dynamics and the
second four represent the lateral dynamics.
The input vector is given by
u = { 6LT , 6RT, _LS, 6RS 6R, 6LE, 6RE, 6LA, 6RA }T, (4-3)
where 6LT is the left engine thrust, _RT is the right engine thrust, _S is
the left stabilator, 6RS is the right stabilator, dR is the rudder, _LE is the
left elevator, _RE is the right elevator, _LA is the left aileron and _RA is
the right aileron.
The system matrix for this operating condition is given by
I
i -0.0389 0.1002 -7.171 -32.163 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 --
0.2784 -0.720 217.3 0.6562 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-0.00024 -0.0064 -0.531 -0.00033 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Aa -
"-- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.149 8.803 -216.3 32.16l
t 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -.0170 -1.560 0.8067 -.000085
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0033 -.1175 -.1503 -.00404i
i 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -.0194 0.0
The input matrix is given by
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-- 0.00038 0.00038 0.00575 0.00575 0.0 0.00276 0.00276 0.00138 0.00138--
-.00000024 -.00000024 -.174 -.174 0.0 -.0835 -.0835 -,0418 -.0418
0.00000626 0.00000626 -.0228 -.0228 0.0 -.0109 -.0109 -.0027 -.0027
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ba m
0.0 0.0 0.0023 -.0023 0.143 0.00111 -.00111 0.00056 -.00056
0.0000015 -.0000015 0.0044 -.0044 0.0096 0.002 -.002 0.0085 -.0085
0.000012 -.000012 0.00074 -.00074 -.Oil2 0.00035 -.00035 0.00071 -.00071
__0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
•--- (4-s)
! The open loop eigenvalues of the aircraft are:
Short Period: -.63 ± 1.17j
Phugoid: -.017 ± .17j
Dutch Roll: -.059 ± l.llj
Spiral: -.0073
Roll Subsidence: -1.735
i 4.2 LINEAR QUADRATIC REGULATOR DESIGN
i_ The control design is based on robust linear quadratic (LQ) regular
theory [13}. The objective of the quadratic design is to minimize a quadratic
f performance index in the formL
---" J = / [ xT Q x + uT R u ] dt (4-6)t o
___ where Q is the state penalty matrix and R is the control penalty matrix.
These two penalty matrices are the LQ design parameters and must be chosen to
_ reflect control effectiveness, control uncertainty and other performance re-
T
quirements. The optimal control that minimizes u(t) is given by
r----
u(t) = -R-I BT K x(t) = -G x(t) (4-7)
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J
where K solves the algebraic Ricatti equationi
0 = AT K + KT A + Q - K B R-I BT K (4-8)
4.2.1 Performance Specifications
Linear quadratic theory guarantees the stability and disturbance rejec-
tion properties of the linear closed loop design. The state and control pen-
alty matrices, however, must be carefully chosen to reflect performance llmi-
tations such as bandwidth constraints. As noted in Section 3, the performance
of multilnput, multioutput (MIMO) systems can be discussed in terms of the
i
sensitivity function. The sensitivity function, or the inverse of the return
i difference of the closed loop system evaluated at the plant inputs, is given
as a function of complex frequency (s) by
S(s) = [I + G(sl - A)-I B]-I (4-9)
l
The relationship of S(s) to feedback system performance has been discussed ex-
Y tensively in the literature [7]-[I0]. Beneficial feedback is obtained for any
frequency for which the sensitivity function is less than unity. Because of
L the uncertainties in the model at high frequencies, the loop transfer function
at the input of the closed loop plant
L(s) = G (sl - A)-IB (4-10)
J
must be rolled off before the uncertainties become significant. For the
Boeing 737 model, the desired crossover of the singular values of loop trans-
fer function was between 1 and 5 rad/sec. The singular values of the return
} difference should attenuate to between .5 and 2.0 dB at 20.0 rad/sec.
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• 4.2.2 Initial Design
An iterative approach is required to choose the state and control penalty
matrix which will reflect the performance specifications. For the initial
design an identity matrix was chosen for the control penalty matrix and a sim-
ple diagonal structure was chosen for the state penalty matrix. Each diagonal
element of the state penalty matrix corresponded to the inverse of the maximum
value of the appropriate state squared. The state penalty matrix for the
initial design is given by
Q1 = diag ( 100.0-2, 20.0-2, .7-2, .35-2, 20.0-2, .7-2 .7-2 .35-2 ) (4-11)
Several initial designs were performed with different values for the control
penalty matrix scale factor, O- As O increases, the magnitude of the loop
transfer function increases. Figs. 4-I and 4-2 show the singular values of
the return difference and the loop transfer function, respectively, for
I
O = .01. There are two lateral loops. An analysis of the corresponding
singular vectors indicated that the primary lateral loop is mainly due to
contributions from the rudder to damp the Dutch Roll mode. The other lateral
[ loop is mainly an aileron loop (see Figs. 4-1 and 4-2) The longitudinal loop
and the rudder loop have acceptable bandwidth and magnitude. The magnitude
l and bandwidth of the aileron loop, however, should be increased.
Several attempts were made to increase the magnitude and bandwidth of the
aileron lateral loop by scaling the state penalty matrix. A loop transfer
7
function can be approximated by the expression]
1 Lc(s) = Ml(sl - A)-I BN (4-12)
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where MI is the square root of QI and N is the square root of R-I. At zero
frequency (d.c.) this expression becomes
Lc(0) = -M 1A -I B N (4-13)
The singular values of the loop transfer function can be moved indepen-
dently at 0 frequency by an appropriate adjustment of the matrix M. Let the
singular value decomposition of Lc(0 ) be defined by
Lc(0) = U Z VH
Define M as:
M=DU H
where D is a diagonal scaling matrix:
D = ,
0 .
_ d m
Then
i M Le(0) = -[ M M1 ] A-I B N = D Z VH (4-14)
! has singiular values oi,...,_ m where
J oi = di _i
i and {Ol,...,_m} are the singular values of Lc(0 ). Thus each singular value at
w = 0 can be chosen independently by an appropriate choice of M as in (4-14),
r
and by specifying the new design parameters as:
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i t
M2 =MM
T M2Q2 = M2
A matrix M was chosen to move only the aileron loop singular value by
choosing d 3 = 7.62. The state penalty matrix Q2 is given by:
m _
O.O00l 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 2.0408 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 8.1633 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
......................... (4-15)Q2 = 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0,0000 0.1434 -0.0015 -0.0788 -0.9053
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0015 2.0408 0.0009 0.0098
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0788 0.0009 2.0849 0.5061
!
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.9053 0.0098 0.5061 13.9780
The singular values of the return difference and the loop transfer function
are shown in Figs. 4-3 and 4-4 respectively. Note that the d.c. gain of the
second lateral loop is now virtually identical to the singular value of the
dominant longitudinal loop. Dynamic compensation could be added in a later
design to increase the bandwidth of this loop. However, for the purposes of
I this report (i.e., to demonstrate the redesign algorithm) this additional
compensation will not be required.
The closed loop eigenvalues of thls design are:
Short Period: -1.4 ± 1.6j
Phugold: -0.096 ± .184j
V
i Dutch Roll: -2.0 ± 2.3j
Roll Subsidence: -1.78
Y
I Spi ral : -. 25
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4.2.3 Bandwidth Limits on the Stabilizers
Since the response time of the stabilizers is limited, it is necessary to
incorporate bandwidth limits into the LQ design. To add dynamic compensation,
the state is augmented with the stabilizer angles to form a new state vector
_ xs = { _ q 8 _ p r # _LS 8RS }T (4-16)
and the new input vector includes the drive signals to the stabilator actu-
ators (dLs,dRS)
Us = { _LT, _RT, dLS, dRS, 6R, 6LE, 8RE, 6LA, 6RA }T (4-17)
The corresponding augmented system matrix, As, and input matrix Bs, are
u m
-- Aa B3 B4
As = (4-18)
-lIT s 0
0
_ 0 -IITs _
and
l 1
y_
1 JIi1B1 B2 0 0 B5 B6 B7 g 8 B9Bs = (4-19)
1/T s 0
0
0
0 1/T s
y
where -1/T s is the stabilator pole and Bj is the jth column of the input
matrix Ba .
t To design an effective controller for this augmented system, a state
[- penalty matrix which will not affect the stabilator poles at -I/T s must be
i %
chosen. For the augmented system the state penalty matrix can be defined as
T M3 (4-2O)Q3 = M3
M3 = [ M2 M' M'' ] (4-21)
and M' and _' € Rnxl. The right eigenvectors for the stabilator poles are
defined as
D
Vsl
Vsl = 1 (4-22)
0
and
m
Vs2
r-
Vs2 = 0 (4-23)
1
Therefore
I Vsl Vsl
i Aa B3 1 B4 1
1 = - -- 1 (4-24)
-- -1/_s 0 Ts
i 0
0 -I/T s 0 0
and
(( Vsl = - Aa + -- I B3 (4-25)
7 Ts
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Similarly
1 )-IVs2 = - Aa + -- I B4 (4-26)Ts
_ Since the right eigenvectors must be perpendicular to M3:
_ M3 Vsl = 0 (4-27)
and
- M3 Vs2 = 0 (4-28)
Therefore
= -M2 Vsl = M 2 Aa +-- I B3 (4-30)
Ts
and
( )M = - M2 Vs2 = M2 A +-- I B4Ta
The matrix M3 becomes
M3 = 2 M2 Aa + -- I [B3 B4 (4-31)
I Ts
For a value of -I/T s = 1.5, the state penalty matrix becomesV
I
0,0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0025 0.0025
0.0000 0.0000 2.0408 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0171 0.0171
i 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 8.1633 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0456 0.0456
.................. _ -- Q -- -- --
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1434 -0.0015 -0.0788 -0.9053 0.0025 -0.0025
03 =
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0015 2.0408 0.0009 0.0098 -0.0033 0.0033
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0,0788 0.0009 2.0849 0.5061 -0.0020 -0.0020
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.9053 0.0098 0.5061 13.9780 -0,0243 -0.0243S
0.0000 0.0023 0.0171 0.0456 0.0025 -0.0033 -0.0020 -0.0243 0.0025 0.0024
0.0000 0.0023 0.0171 0.0456 -0.0025 0.0033 0.0020 0.0243 0.0024 0.0025
(4-32)
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The singular values of the return difference and the loop transfer function
are shown in Figs. 4-5 and 4-6 respectively. As expectedthe lateralloops
are not affected by placing limitations on the stabilator. In the previous
design, the stabilators and elevators were the major contributors to the lon-
gitudinal loop. In this design, there are two longitudinal loops - one which
is predomlnately affected by the elevators and one which is predominately
affected by the stabilators.
The singular values of the feedback system transfer function with the
_ stabilator loops open (and all other loops closed) are shown in Fig. 4-7. The
solid plot represents the collective action of the stabilator. The bandwidth
of this loop is clearlywithin the 1.5 rad/secbandwidththat was desired.
The dotted plot representsthe differentialactionof the stabilators,and is
negligible.
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The closed loop elgenvalues for this third design moved only slightly
from their locations in the second design:
Short Period: -1.3 ± 1.4j
Phugoid: -.12 ± .18j
Dutch Roll: -2.0 ± 2.3j
Roll Subsidence: -1.78
Spiral: -.25
Stabilizer: -1.5, -1.5
4.2.4 Integral Control
As a final step, two integrators were added to the augmented state
equation to improve low frequency response to pitch and roll commands. The
integral states are defined as:
_ Xl = A C xs (4-33)
where (4-33) defines the output matrix C.
The new augmented 12 state system then becomes:
Ex jF -I x A (4-34)I X S
= x + us (4-35)
r 0 As Bs
A B
where As and Bs are given by (4-18)-(4-19).
F
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The square root of the state penalty matrix will be of the form:
M4 = [ MI M2 Ms ] _ (4-36)
where MI is the integrator penalty matrix, M2 is the penalty matrix from
design 2, and Ms is the stabilator penalty matrix that ensures the stabilator
poles are not moved (see subsection 4.2.3). The integrator state penalty
matrix will be chosen to achieve significant effects from the integrator at
-- frequencies less than I rad/sec.
The LQ approximation to the loop transfer functions (4-12) with the
matrices A, B, M4, and N4 can be used to examine the low frequency behavior
of the loop transfer function. For m small, (4-12) becomes:
1 -I
Lc(jm) =- -- MI [ C As Bs ] N (4-37)jm
Since we want the low frequency behavior to look like
1
Lc(j ]=---
(i.e., significant at frequencies less than 1 rad/sec), we choose MI to set
the singular values of the matrix on the right side of (4-37) to unity. If
the singular value decomposition of [ M2 A-I B ] is:
-I
F C As Bs = U £ VH (4-38)
we can choose MI to be:
MI = U E-I UH (4-39)
where U is any orthogonal matrix.
Once MI is chosen, Ms can be specified using the procedure from subsec-
J
tion (4.2.3) with [MI MZ] replacing M2. The quadratic state penalty matrix is
_ defined as:
then
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-- T
Q4 = M4 M4 (4-40)
and is given by:
- 7.1798 0.0000 0.00(30 0.0000 0.0000 -7.6557 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0160 -0.0160-
0.0000 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0578 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000
...................................
0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
__ 0.0000 0.0000 0.00(30 0.0025 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0023 0.0023
0.0000 0.0000 1].0000 0.0000 2.0408 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0171 0.0171
7.6557 0.0000 0.00(30 0.0000 0.0000 8.1633 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0171 0.0171
-- Q4 m - . _ . .................... . ...... . . . .
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1434 .-0.0015 -0.0788 .-0.9053 0.0025 -0.0025
0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0015 2.0408 0.0009 0.0098 -0.0033 0.0033
0.0000 -0.0578 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0788 0.0009 2.0849 0.5061 -0.0020 0.0020
0.0000 0.0020 0.00(30 0.0000 0.0000 0.0(300 -0.9053 0.0098 0.5061 13.9780 -0.0243 0.0243
...................................
-0.0160 0.0000 0.0000 0.0023 0.0171 0.0171 0.0025 -0.0033 -0.0020 -0.0243 0.0017 0.0022
-0.0160 0.0000 0.0000 0.0023 0.0171 0.0171 -0.0025 0.0033 0.0020 0.0243 0.0022 0.0023
(4-41)
The singular values of the resulting design are shown in Figs. 4-8 and
i
4-9. The loop shapes are largely unaffected by the incorporation of the
integral feedback with the exception of the desired low frequency gain increase
and a slightly increased bandwidth. The pitch and roll response due to pitch
i
and roll reference commands (subtracted from the state variables in the input
equation) is shown in Fig. 4-10. The closed loop eigenvalues of the aircraft
are:
Short Period: -1.2 ± 1.4j
Phugoid: -.31 ± .30j
! Dutch Roll: -2.0 ± 2.3j
Roll Subsidence: -1.78
Spiral: -.25
Stabilators: -1.5, -1.5
Roll Integrator: -.01
Pitch Integrator: -.08
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4.3 RESTRUCTURING FOLLOWING A RUDDER FAILURE
The llnearized Boeing 737 model and the control system designed in sub-
,! section 4.2 were used to demonstrate the automatic redesign procedure. The
__ failure that was examined was a complete failure of the rudder. The resulting
I
I closed loop Dutch roll mode after failure but before restructuring was:
F -.08 ± i.I
The system was redesigned using the procedure described in Section 3.
The Dutch roll mode of the resulting closed loop system was:
-.38 ± 1.15
While thls mode is somewhat underdamped, it is much better than the open loop
[- mode. The singular values of the loop transfer function of the restructuredi
system are shown in Figure 4-11. Note that the lateral singular value that
F-
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i
corresponded to the rudder loop in the unfailed aircraft is significantly
lower than the nominal design (see Fig. 4-9).
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Figure 4-11. Singular Values of the Restructured System
Following the Loss of the Rudder
The mechanism by which this restructuring was accomplished can be
examined by studying the relative sizes of the individual components of the
singular vectors. The relative sizes of these components represent the rela-
tive contribution of each surface to the singular value loop. In the unfailed
aircraft, the rudder constituted nearly all the control energy in the dominant
lateral loop:
Rudder - 98%
In the restructured system, the role of the rudder is assumed primarily by
the ailerons with a small contribution from the elevators:
Ailerons - 84%
F_
I Elevators - 14%
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A comparison of the roll responses of llnearlzed models of the unfailed
aircraft and restructured aircraft is shown in Fig. 4-12. As would be expected
from a comparison of the closed loop eigenvalues, the Dutch roll mode intro-
_ duces a more oscillatory response in the roll angle of the restructured air-
craft. Figures 4-13 and 4-14 provide a comparison of the rudder and aileron
-- deflections of the two configurations. These figures illustrate the replace-
ment of the role of the rudder in the damping of the Dutch roll mode by a slm-
ilar, but less effective, role for the aileron.
The unfailed and restructured aircraft were also simulated using a white
noise wind model. The spectral densities of the noise processes were taken to
- be 2 ft/sec 2 in the horizontal and lateral axes and I ft/sec 2 in the vertical
axis. An example of the resulting roll responses of the unfailed aircraft and
the reconfigured aircraft are shown in Fig. 4-15. The response of the recon-
figured aircraft is only slightly degraded from the response of the unfailed
aircraft. Figures 4-16 and 4-17 again illustrate the use of ailerons in the
restructured design to replace the function of the failed rudder.
55
i
i
-- 20.0 4.0I I
3.0
-- R
0 IO.O
t. _ _.0
A
G t.O
L 0.0 "_ ..................
€
__ I). 0 ....................................
-tO.O I 1 -I.O t I
8.0 S.O IO.,O IS.O O.O S.O IO.O IS.O
-- TTr_ q:SCCS) T1r_ (SCCS)
I_OR.AL rA_LL"D ..... I_ORr_AL _ IrAILI[D ..........
_. Figure 4-12. Roll Responses of the Unfailed Figure 4-13. Rudder Responses of the Unfailed
and Restructured Aircraft to a and Restructured Aircraft to a
I0° Roll Offset I0° Roll Offset
IO.O
! I
$.0
X
-- L
€ 0.0 ............ ,,
R
o - /
•" "v"
oS.e
-- -IO.Q ! I
O.e S.O le.O IS.e
TZ.C {$CCS)
_R.AL _ rAXLCD ..........
Figure 4-14. Differential Aileron Responses of the Unfailed
and Restructured Aircraft to a I0° Roll Offset
7
56
F--
I
[
-- 0.4Q
i i Q.19
!
x\
-- R e._S
0 0._ . " _"
L
L U
A _ O e.e9-- H D
c ./'_ (
L O.e9 _ R
C
-e.e$
-8.28 I I -0.1_ I "I
8.1 S.9 le.e I$.e Q.I $.0 le.9 IS.e
-- 1Z_ (SC¢S)
I+ORM;L __ YA;L(D __ I+ORm+L __ rAZLCD ___.
Figure 4-15. Roll Responses of the Unfailed Figure 4-16 Rudder Responses of the Unfailedo •
and Restructured Aircraft to a and Restructured Aircraft to a
White Noise Wind Model White Noise Wind Model
57
I
SECTION 5
APPLICATION TO AN ADVANCED FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
The automatic redesign procedure was demonstrated on an ATF class fighter
aircraft to illustrate its ability to successfully handle higher bandwidth,
open loop unstable systems. The model used for this demonstration is the
-- Northrop Design Methods for Integrated Control Systems (DMICS) model, which is
a modification of the FA-18/A. The control configuration used was the stan-
dard FA-18/A configuration augmented with horizontal canards. The linearized
_ dynamics were obtained at MAC}{ .8 and I0,000 feet with a trim angle of attack
of 1.3 °. The aircraft at this flight condition is open loop unstable, with
the open loop poles being:
Short Period 2.8, -5.9
Phugoid: -.019 ± .026j
Dutch Roll: -.44 ± 2.6j
Spiral: -.01
i_ Roll Subsidence: -3.7552
I A simplified regulator design with a limited set of performance specifi-
cations was developed using LQ design techniques to illustrate the redesign
procedure. The dominant singular values of the loop transfer function of the
unfailed aircraft are shown in Fig. 5-1. The closed loop eigenvalues are:
Short Period: -5.0 ± 2.0j Dutch Roll: -2.9 ± 3.9j .
The relative contributions of each of the surfaces to the longtitudinal sin-
gular value are: Right Stabilator-39%; Left Stabilator-39%; Right Canard-10%;l
Left Canard-10%.
V--
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_ Following a failure of the right stabilator, the FCS was reconflgured
using the automatic redesign algorithm. The dominant singular values of the
loop transfer function of the reconfigured aircraft are shown in Fig. 5-2.
Note that the reconfigured singular values are virtually indistinguishable
from those of the unfailed aircraft. The closed loop eigenvalues also remain
virtually unchanged. The relative contributions of each surface are: Right
Canard-45%; Left Stabilator-43%; Left Candard-3%. Note that the reconflgura-
" tion has redistributed the responsibility for longitudinal stabilization and
pitch control to the remaining effectors in the longitudinal system.
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-- Values of the Reconfigured Aircraft Following a Right
Stabilator Failure
The left stabilator of the aircraft was then failed (resulting in both
stabilators missing). The dominant singular values of the loop transfer
i function of the reconfigured aircraft are shown in Fig. 5-3. The longitudi-
J hal singular value is noticeably lower than the co=respondlng value of the
unfailed aircraft in Fig. 5-I, but is still acceptable. The closed loop
elgenvalues are: -
Short Period: -5.3 ± -3.8j Dutch Roll: -2.9 ± 3.9j .
The relative contributions of the surfaces with both stabilators failed is:
Right Canard-45%; Left Canard-45%; Leading Edge Flaps-4%; Ailerons-4%.
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In each of these cases the lateral singular value was virtually
unaffected. The principal reason for this is that this loop approximately
corresponds to a yaw damping loop. The stabilators have only a relatively
minor contrlbution (_20%) to this loop, and can be readily replaced by redis-
tributing authority to the rudders and ailerons.
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-- SECTION 6
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
This report has presented the development and preliminary demonstration
-- of an automatic redesign algorithm for restructurable flight control systems.
The automatic redesign procedure possesses a number of highly desirable
-- features. The procedure was developed from an optimization formulation that
attempts to maximize a measure of feedback system performance while satisfying
the bandwidth limitations of the control system. As a result, the procedure
_ can be interpreted as reconstructing the nominal forces and moments of the
unfailed aircraft as nearly as possible. In addition, the control effector
bandwidths can be explicitly incorporated in the redesigned system. By using
the nominal control system design parameters as a basis for the redesign, the
procedure effectively transfers the engineering trade-offs used in the control
system design for the unfailed aircraft to the restructured control system
design. The performance of the restructured design degrades gracefully (while
maintaining robustness margins) as the severity of the failure increases.
Since the algorithm recovers the design parameters of the unfailed systems
when supplied with the unfailed system model, the original FCS is also recov-
ered. Finally, the ability to incorporate failure detection estimates in the
FCS restructuring helps to reduce the requirements placed on the FDI algorithm
I and can enhance the reliability of the restructuring system.
t
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In addition to restructuring of the dynamic compensation to provide sta-
bility and dynamic disturbance rejection, a restructurable control system must
be able to automatically trim the aircraft. The automatic trim problem has
-- two important facets: a llnearlzed trim problem for rejecting disturbances
while maintaining a specified flight condition; and the problem of choosing
the flight condition (operating point) to provide the greatest safety and fly-
ing qualities. While the first problem was discussed briefly in Section 2,
only a formal solution was presented. This solution certaintly requires fur-
_ ther study. The nonlinear problem of choosing a flight condition has not yet
been addressed. Finally, each of the individual modules will have to be com-
bined with a FDI system to produce a truly restructurable control system.
i
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